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ABSTRACT
Nuclear reactors supply steam for over twenty percent of the United States'
electricity generation. Yet, perhaps no other technology has elicited as much
controversy. Fears and emotions drive a controversy and debate that
originates both in the technical realities of nuclear power and in the
psychological and social uncertainties connected with nuclear energy,
advanced technology, social power, and modern warfare. Expression of these
social concerns comes partly through public protest, through interest group
formation and activity, and through governmental oversight and regulation.
These different modes of expression represent society's efforts to control the
nuclear technology that causes their unease.
The means of social input -- government regulation, group legal
interventions, public protest -- have all significantly impacted the nuclear
industry. Social mechanisms guide utility operations, affecting safety,
performance, and cost. One question that arises is whether the policies and
structures in place impact industry performance and social welfare in a
positive manner. Do social concerns lead to improvements in nuclear
performance and safety? When utilities react to social concerns, do their
actions beget more concern creating additional public unease? Are these
feedback mechanisms in the public interest?
In creating the Social Pressure, Safety Regulation Model, or SPSRM, this
thesis concentrates on the social system and its responses to nuclear
performance.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Kent Hansen
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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Chapter 1
1.0 Introduction
"Controversy over nuclear energy, both bombs and reactors, has been
exceptionally durable and violent, exciting more emotion and public
protest than any other technology."
Spencer R. Weart (1991, p. 30)
Nuclear reactors supply steam for over twenty percent of the United States'
electricity generation. Yet, as Weart noted, perhaps no other technology has
elicited as much controversy. Emotions and fears drive much of the
controversy and debate. The public's fears originate both in the technical
realities of nuclear power and in the psychological and social uncertainties
connected with nuclear energy, advanced technology, social power, and
modern warfare. Expression of social concerns over nuclear power comes
partly through public protest, through interest group formation and activity,
and through governmental oversight and regulation. These different modes
of expression represent society's efforts to control a technology that many feel
places an unnecessary risk upon the general public.
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Government regulation, legal intervention, public protest, have all
significantly impacted the nuclear industry. Social mechanisms place
restrictions and burdens on utility operations, affecting safety, performance,
and cost. Are these restrictions positive? Do social concerns lead to
improvements in nuclear performance and safety? When utilities react to
social concerns, do their actions beget more concern creating additional public
unease? This thesis studies the interaction between the nuclear industry and
the social system, trying to identify how industry actions affect public
concerns and how these concerns are translated into social action which, in
turn, affects nuclear operations. A better understanding of social and nuclear
industry interactions might reveal ways of improving industry and social
structure and policies to provide safer and more reliable nuclear energy at
competitive cost.
1.1 Background
All one hundred and ten commercial reactors operating within the United
States are light-water reactors utilizing either a pressurized (PWR) or boiling
water (BWR) design. A reactor, like a coal-fire boiler, is a source of heat for
the production of steam. Water circulating through the core removes heat
produced by fission of the fuel within the reactor core. This heated water
produces steam either by boiling at the top of the reactor or by circulating
through a heat exchanger called a steam generator. Steam then turns a
turbine which spins the generator producing electricity. Thermal/steam
systems of similar configuration generate over ninety percent of United
States' electricity.
What separates a nuclear power plant from other thermal power plants is the
use of nuclear fission to generate heat and steam. Nuclear fission occurs
when an atom of a heavy element splits into two or more lighter pieces.
Fission may be spontaneous or induced by striking a heavy atom with a
neutron. Because the nuclear forces binding the heavier element are much
less than those binding the lighter pieces, the splitting of the heavy atom
releases tremendous energy. Commercial nuclear reactors primarily utilize
12
uranium 235 with neutron induced fission. Uranium 235 is a naturally
occurring but rare isotope of uranium. (Natural uranium contains
approximately 99.3% U238 and 0.7% U235.) When a uranium 235 atom splits,
two or more atoms of lighter elements are produced. In addition, one or
more neutrons are released. These neutrons may then proceed to split
additional uranium 235 atoms, creating a chain reaction where neutrons
released from a prior split proceed to strike and split an additional uranium
235 atom releasing more neutrons which split other uranium 235 atoms
releasing more neutrons and so on and so on. If the chain reaction is self-
sustaining, not growing or decaying (that is each uranium fission on average
produces one additional fission), then the chain reaction is said to be critical.
Commercial power reactors operate at criticality. The energy released by
uranium 235 fissions heats the cooling water which eventually drives the
generator.
The human hazard comes primarily from radiation, which can kill, cause
cancer, or damage genetic material. Unstable, energetic atoms often break
apart emitting energy, mass, or both. The process of coming apart or emitting
energy is called radioactive decay. Although there are many forms of decay,
three are most common: alpha decay, beta decay, and gamma decay. Alpha
decay occurs when a nucleus spits out two protons and two neutrons (a
helium nucleus). Beta decay occurs when an atom spits out a high speed
electron. Gamma decay occurs when an atom, instead of emitting mass,
releases a burst of electromagnetic energy in the form of gamma rays. Alpha
particles, beta particles, and gamma rays are nuclear radiation, and atoms
which emit them or materials containing such atoms are said to be
radioactive. Harm to humans, or any living thing, occurs when radiation
enters or passes through the body and interacts with living cells. The
energetic particles or rays can kill or damage living cells. If the genetic
structure of normal body tissue is damaged, cancer will sometimes occur. If
the genetic structure of reproductive or fetal cells is damaged, birth defects
may occur. However, to kill or damage enough cells to immediately kill or
serious injury a person requires an extremely large dose of radiation, many
orders of magnitude above background radiation. On the other hand, cancer
and even birth defects can potentially result from extended exposure to low
levels of radiation, on the order of background.
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Unfortunately, radiation is an inherent feature of nuclear fission. Radiation
may be emitted during the fission process, by radioactive fission products
(lighter elements created by the fission process), by radioactive decay products,
or by materials irradiated by nuclear radiation. Because shielding and
distance virtually eliminate any direct offsite exposure from the reactor
vessel, the danger of public exposure comes not from direct radiation being
emitted by the operating reactor but from the potential of an accidental offsite
release of radioactive material. Although rare, equipment failures and
human error have resulted in accidental releases. For over ten days in 1986,
radioactive material spewed from the Chernobyl site in the Ukraine causing
wide spread exposure and concern: twenty-nine power plant workers and
firefighters died of acute radiation exposure and over 135,000 people within a
twenty mile radius were evacuated. By far the worst reactor accident in
World History, Chernobyl lacked many of the safety systems required in the
U.S. However, even in the U.S. small releases have occurred. In 1979, Three
Mile Island released small quantities of radioactive gases, producing very
small exposures for the general public -- probably less than a third of yearly
background exposure (Wolfson 1991, p. 198). By far the worst accident in U.S.
History, Three Mile Island released less than a millionth the radiation that
Chernobyl did (Wolfson 1991, p. 77).
Is nuclear power safe? Yes: Multiple safety systems ensure that
radiation will be contained even when malfunctions and operator
errors occur. Major accidents are possible, but are so unlikely that the
risk is negligible. You are far more likely to die in an automobile
accident, a fall, or a fire than in a nuclear accident. And no other
industry can match the safety record of the U.S. commercial nuclear
power enterprise. (Wolfson 1991, p. 209)
Although a nuclear accident may be the public's dominate technical concern
with nuclear power plants, there are other technical issues inherent with the
nuclear power industry which concern the public. Operating a nuclear power
plant produces unwanted radioactive materials. These materials are
generally classified as waste and must be dealt with in some manner. Like all
hazardous waste, radioactive waste raises environmental and human
concerns. Two classifications of radioactive waste exist: high level (highly
14
radioactive) which is primarily spent fuel, and low level (somewhat
radioactive), which covers everything from irradiated tools to contaminated
clothing. High level waste creates the greatest concerns because it is highly
toxic to living beings. Currently in the U.S., no satisfactory means exist for
dealing with long term storage of these materials, although a storage facility at
Yucca Mountain in Nevada is under investigation. Still of some concern,
low level waste is generally buried at low level waste depositories, where it is
to remain until no longer an environmental or health threat. Although
nuclear power plants are not the only source for both high and low level
waste (weapons programs, hospitals, universities, and other sources produce
both types), waste is an operational hazard of the industry.
Although the technical hazards associated with nuclear power drive much of
the public's concern, the public's fear over nuclear power has many origins.
The threat of nuclear bombs and the images of destruction are always present
in the nuclear debate. The horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined with
the knowledge of mutually assured destruction delicately balanced during the
cold war has ingrained a fearful image of nuclear technology in peoples'
minds. Even though the complete failure of a nuclear power plant could
never produce the destruction of a nuclear bomb, the imagery persists. Real
connections to the bomb do exist. However, typical commercial reactors are
ill suited for weapons development. Bombs require either plutonium or
highly enriched uranium, while commercial fuel, although uranium, is
enriched only 1 to 3 percent. Spent fuel contains some plutonium which
could be remove if reprocessed. However, commercial reactors are not
designed for plutonium production, and reprocessing is a difficult and
expensive endeavor. Thus, imagery and reality mix to connect the
destruction of nuclear warfare to the energy production of commercial power
reactors.
Societal perceptions of modern technology and social power also contribute to
public concerns over nuclear power. The impersonality of the machine, the
regularity of modern industrial society, and the complexity of advanced
technologies alienates many within the public. This general frustration and
hostility toward the advances of technology is projected onto the nuclear
industry. Aversion to the centralization of social and political power also
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becomes symbolized in the nuclear power plant as economies of scale have
led to huge thousand megawatt concentrations of electric power generation.
As Weart asserted, "Reactors became a condensed symbol for all modern
industrial society." (Weart 1991, p. 35)
The building and operation of a nuclear power plant presents a highly
charged public controversy. As discussed, real risk and the imagery of nuclear
technology combine to create public concerns and fears. These in turn drive
social efforts to control and direct this technology.
1.2 Problem
The public and nuclear utility do not function in separate worlds. Social
actions driven by public concerns and fears significantly affect the functioning
of a nuclear power plant. Utilities spend tremendous quantities of time and
resources addressing social concerns. This includes interacting directly with
the public and groups expressing specific public concerns along with satisfying
governmental regulation and oversight. The question is how and in what
manner do social concerns affect the nuclear plant? Will the interactions
between the nuclear utility and the social system provide nuclear safety and
inexpensive electricity?
Certainly, public opposition has influenced the nuclear industry. Public
protest combined with legal interventions by public interest groups
significantly hampered efforts to bring on-line the Seabrook Power Station in
New Hampshire and the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station on Long Island:
construction permits were issued in 1976 for Seabrook and 1973 for
Shoreham, yet operation of Seabrook did not begin until 1990 and Shoreham
was scrapped in 1988 after completion of construction but without ever being
fully operational. Regulatory changes instituted after Three Mile Island also
contributed substantially to the long construction delays. Additionally,
Rancho Seco near Sacramento was shut down following a public forum in
the late 1980s, and Yankee Atomic's recent decision to shut down Yankee
Rowe in Western Massachusetts was heavily influenced by public and
intervener group opposition. Obviously, public concerns play a role in the
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nuclear debate. But what are the mechanisms? Do social factors affect
operations beyond the licensing process and how?
The International Program for Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety, a
project within MIT's Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research,
is sponsoring research to study the nuclear industry's interactions with the
social system. This effort seeks to better understand how the social system,
which is external to the nuclear utility's management and operation, impacts
plant safety and performance. The goal of the overall project is to model the
functioning of the nuclear plant and its interactions with the external world,
perhaps finding how best to interact with that world.
This thesis seeks to model how the social system responds to the operation of
a nuclear power plant. It is a piece of the more comprehensive effort to study
the general dynamics between the nuclear industry and the external world.
The objective is not to develop a precise prediction of the social system but to
gain a better understanding of social behavior in response to the functioning
of the nuclear industry and the nuclear industry's response to social behavior.
1.3 Method
The focus of this thesis is the development a system dynamics model of the
social system interacting with the nuclear industry. The social organizations
and interactions comprising the public, government, and nuclear power
industry present a complex system with many information-feedback paths.
System dynamics adapts information-feedback theories from control systems
engineering for studying complex social systems such as the nuclear plant,
society connection. It provides a means to simulate the complex, inter-
connectivity of human endeavors.
The system dynamics approach to modeling has been translated into
commercially available software packages that facilitate developing models of
specific systems. One such package, Stella II®, was used in this thesis.
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The overall model development began with an effort to represent the cause-
effect relations between aspects of nuclear plant operations and the
social/political systems external to the plant. The result of the process is a so-
called "causal loop" diagram. Development the causal loop diagram was an
iterative process. At each stage of development, experts in the nuclear
industry reviewed the representation of cause/effect relationships in the
model, suggesting modifications when appropriate. This development
occurred in 1992 and 1993. After completing the causal loop diagram, these
ideas were converted into a explicit mathematical model using the Stella II®
program. Subsequently, the mathematical model was used to generate a host
of numerical simulations of system behavior. The overall model has four
segments as illustrated in Figure 1.1. This thesis is concerned with the Social
Pressure / Safety Regulation segment.
The next chapter presents a brief overview of the system dynamics method to
acquaint the reader with how models are created and represented. Chapter 3
presents the details of the SP/SR model including the Stella II®
representations. Chapter 4 shows some results of a few simulations. It
should be recognized that these results are preliminary and are merely
indicative of how the approach may be used to analyze policy options. Before
results can be given credibility, the remaining portions of the model need to
be completed and a rigorous validation process undertaken. Chapter 5
reviews possible policy implications. Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis and
comments on future directions.
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Figure 1.1 Sector Diagram
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Chapter 2
2.0 System Dynamics
"Industrial [System] dynamics is the study of the information-feedback
characteristics of industrial activity to show how organizational
structure, amplification (in policies), and time delays (in decisions and
actions) interact to influence the success of the enterprise."
Jay W. Forrester (1961, p. 13)
In the late 1950s, Jay Forrester and others at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology began applying theories of information-feedback from control
systems engineering to the study of modern industrial systems. Since then,
system dynamics has been applied to an array of complex social systems.
These applications are based on several premises. First, information-feedback
is integral to the human decision making process. Humans act in response to
the environment. These actions alter the environment creating a new basis
for future decisions guiding future actions. Second, human judgment cannot
always predict the behavior of complex systems:
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... The structure of a complex system is not a simple feedback loop
where one system state dominates the behavior. The complex system
has a multiplicity of interacting feedback loops. Its internal rates of
flow are controlled by nonlinear relationships. The complex system is
of high order, meaning that there are many system states (or levels). It
usually contains positive-feedback loops describing growth processes as
well as negative, goal-seeking loops. In the complex system the cause
of a difficulty may lie far back in time from the symptoms, or in a
completely different and remote part of the system. In fact, causes are
usually found, not in prior events, but in the structure and policies of
the system. (Forrester 1969, p. 9)
The complexity of markets, businesses, governments, eco-systems, etc. is such
that the unaided human mind can not follow cause-effect relationships
accurately enough to predict behavior. The third premise follows the
observation that most system troubles are created by the internal structure of
social systems. People often attribute troubles to external causes when in
reality the culprits are the policies and structures within the system. The
fourth premise looks to the future with the belief that structural and policy
changes can improve system performance. Efforts in system dynamics are
undertaken with the belief that a better understanding of system behavior can
lead to ways of improving system performance. (Forrester 1961, p. 14)
2.1 Developing The System Dynamic's Perspective
Whenever humans approach a problem, past experiences are applied to the
task at hand in hopes of matching this experience with the present difficulty
to find a solution. In essence, mental pictures, or models, of how the world
works are used to solve the problem before us. The system dynamics
methodology presents one picture, or view, of the world which might aid us
in solving problems. That view has several characteristics. As stated
previously, system dynamics sees the causes of social and organizational
problems as originating internally within the social and organizational
systems. This implies that the systems under study is closed-looped. That
does not mean that a system is all inclusive. However, most systems under
study can be identified and separated from the remainder of the world.
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Another characteristic of system dynamics is that builds upon the operational
aspects of a system. The cause-effect relationships developed within a system
dynamics model find their origins in physical realities of the world, not in
ambiguous correlations. Finally, system dynamics focuses on patterns of
system behavior over the passage of time and not on unique events, even if
dramatic.
Identifying the structures and policies of the system as the source of troubling
behavior requires that system boundaries be chosen such that what generates
the unwanted behavior lies within the system. As an example, suppose the
local rabbit population were disappearing. Including only the rabbits in the
system might be insufficient to create the population dynamics. However,
including the local predator and food supply within the system's boundaries
might enable one to create a system model which more accurately depicts the
fluctuations within the rabbit population. On the other hand, including sun
spots or eruptions of Mount Pinatubo might obscure the most important
cause-effect relationships within the rabbit system, even if these events may
be remotely connected to rabbit behavior.
Drawing system boundaries is only the beginning. The cause-effect
relationships must also be identified. To illustrate this point, ask yourself
what causes academic success? (example taken from High Performance
Systems 1992, p. 27) Below is a list of several things which may affect a
students performance in school.
* motivation
* teaching quality
* intelligence
* attendance
* parental involvement
* physical well-being
· mental well-being
· classroom environment
However, this list alone provides limited information because it provides no
structure as to the causality of the system. In addition to asking what causes
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academic success, one should ask: how? Figure 2.1 graphically depicts the
cause-effect relationships among some of the variables listed above.
Teaching ,
Quality
Academic
___ _-_-__ Achievement
Mol
Attendance 4
Figure 2.1: Causal-Loop Diagram
Academic Achievement
(High Performance Systems 1992, p. 28)
Figure 2.1 graphically displays a so called "causal-loop" diagram. Within this
causal-loop diagram, motivation fosters achievement which then creates
motivation: a feedback loop. Teachers notice academic achievement and are
themselves inspired to give more time and effort to shinning pupils. This
attention increases teaching quality which feeds back to motivate students
even more. Attendance follows a similar feedback path. All of these cause-
effect relationships are "positive" feedback loops. That is they promote a
spiraling upward or downward: more of one causes more of the other which
cause more of the first in the upward spiral and vice versa on the downward
spiral. Intelligence or mental well-being or parental involvement could
create loops which limit these upward or downward spirals: i.e. less
motivation or teaching quality might spark more parental involvement.
These would be limiting or "negative" feedback loops. Both positive and
negative information-feedback are integral to most human endeavors, as this
example illustrates.
24
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One thing which separates system dynamics methodology from other
modeling techniques is the effort to incorporate the cause-effect mechanisms
within the model. For example, an econometric model predicting the price or
production of pork bellies may vary only as a function of several
macroeconomic variables such as GNP, Interest Rates, Housing Starts, etc.
Pork Bellies = I3l*GNP + 132*Interest Rates + 33*Housing Starts +...
In these types of linear models, there may be nothing in the equation which
actually relates to pigs or the inventory of pork. If one wanted to predict the
production of pork, the inventory of hogs might be of importance to the
future levels of pork bellies. To use system dynamics, one would take an
operational approach. The structure of the system which creates pork bellies
would be fundamental to the system dynamic's modeling of production.
GNP may have a correlation to pork bellies, but available hogs and breeding
stocks along with gestating periods and maturing times are more important
to structure future production. System dynamics tries to replicate the
operational structure behind the system under study so that the modeler can
understand how system structure affects behavior.
Determining how the system behaves and why it behaves as it does are both
objectives of system dynamic modeling. It is dynamic behavior that system
dynamics seeks to understand. That is, the patterns of pork bellies or of
academic achievement over time. The prediction of particular events, such
as receiving a grade of A or F in a particular class or the number of hogs
slaughtered on May 1st, are not the purpose of this technique. Understanding
why academic achievement goes up or down, why pork production increases
or decreases, and what time frames are involved are what is important in
system dynamics modeling.
2.2 Model Structure
"Stocks and flows are the nouns and verbs of [system dynamics]. Stocks are
the 'things'. Flows are the 'actions'." (High Performance Systems 1992, p. 37)
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Stocks, or levels, represent accumulations: money in your bank account, hogs
in the barnyard, love in one's heart, worries in one's head, people in a city,
widgets in inventory. Accumulations are in almost every system. They
indicate the status of the system at any particular time: how rich one is or the
adequacy of production.
If there is an accumulation of something, that accumulation resulted from
some action, a flow. Stocks and flows go hand-in-hand. Nothing can
accumulate without flowing. Money cannot enter an account without
someone depositing it. Hogs do not mysteriously appear in the barnyard;
they are born or purchased. Inventory is produced. Love grows, etc. Flows
represent the action of accumulating.
A system dynamics model consists of an assortment of stocks and flows. They
are the building blocks of system dynamic models. Stocks, or rather
information about stocks, structure the decisions which control system flows.
These flows change the status of the system causing new decisions to be made
which specify new rates of flow. Such information-feedback creates a complex
dynamic directing the system. To illustrate how stocks and flows are pieced
together to model a simple system, the next section will step through the
building of a simple model of population growth.
2.3 Building a Simple Population Growth Model
The population growth exercise will step through three successions of the
model, starting with a linear relationship with no feedback, followed by a
simple feedback structure, and finally a limiting feedback loop will be added.
Causal relationships for each stage will be presented, followed by a translation
of these relationships into the Stella II® model format. System behavior of
each stage will be presented after the structure is reviewed.
2.3.1 Linear Population Growth with no Feedback
What causes a population to grow? The primary mechanisms are births and
deaths of individuals. The correlation between births and deaths controls
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whether the population increases, remains stable, or declines. In the real
world, many complex interactions control the birth and death rates of any
living species. However, to illustrate one could imagine a simple structure
where a population grew or declined with a constant number of births and
deaths.
Deaths
Population
Births
Figure 2.2: Causal Loop Diagram
Linear Population Growth
Figure 2.2 depicts a population whose growth or decline is solely a function of
births and deaths, both of which are independent of the population. No
feedback paths exist. Figure 2.3 shows the causal diagram in Figure 2.2
translated into the Stella II® format. Population is a stock. Births and deaths
are flows. With births and deaths set at constant values independent of
population, one would expect a linear growth or decline of the population
depending on which rate, birth or death, was larger. This is the case as shown
in Figure 2.4. If the initial population is one million individuals and the
birth and death rates are 20,000 and 30,000 per year, respectively, a linear
decline in population occurs, as shown in Figure 2.4. If the numerical values
for births and deaths are reversed, growth occurs, also shown in Figure 2.4.
Population
Births Deaths
Figure 2.3: Stella II Diagram
Linear Population Growth
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1: Population 2: Population
1: 1
1: 1
0.00 12.50 25.00
Figure 2.4: Population Growth
Linear with no Feedback
2.3.2- Exponential Population Growth with Feedback
Popula
37.50 50.00
14:36 7/29/93
Deaths
tionh Rate
Death Rate
Births
Birth Rate
Figure 2.5: Causal-Loop Diagram
Exponential Population Growth
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Exponential growth, or decline, results when births and deaths are a function
of the population itself. Figure 2.5 shows the feedback loops between births,
deaths, and population. Figure 2.6 translates Figure 2.5 into Stella II® format.
As before, population is a stock and births and deaths are flows. However,
Fig. 2.6 includes two additional converter inputs: birth rate and death rate.
These are constant variables which feed into the birth and death calculations.
Births equal the population times the birth rate, and deaths equal the
population times the death rate.
Population
Birth Fraction Death Fraction
Figure 2.6: Stella II Diagram
Exponential Population Growth
As babies are born, the population grows. However, since births are a
function of the birth rate and the population, a growing population
experiences an increasing number of births. If the birth rate is greater than
the death rate, the positive feedback between births and population will cause
the population to grow exponentially, as seen in Fig. 2.7. If the death rate is
greater, the positive loop between population and deaths will cause an
exponential decline in population, as shown in Fig. 2.8. For exponential
growth shown in Fig. 2.7, the birth rate is 0.3 while the death rate is 0.2. For
exponential decline shown in Fig. 2.8, the birth rate is 0.2 while the death rate
is 0.3.
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1: Population
1:
1: 10
a
0.00 12.50 25.00 37.50 50.00
Years 14:48 7/29/93
Figure 2.7: Population Growth
Exponential Growth
1: Population
0.00 12.50 25.00 37.50 50.00
a Years 14:47 7/29/93
Figure 2.8: Population Growth
Exponential Decline
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1: 1
1:
1:
2.3.3 Population Growth with Limiting Loop
What happens if the population confronts a limited food supply? Figure 2.9
adds the effects of a limited food supply to the population model. The food
required to feed the society is a function of the population and is represented
by nutrition needs. Nutrition surplus compares the needs of the population
to the supply available. The death rate now becomes a function of the
nutrition surplus. As the nutrition surplus declines, the death rate increases.
This places a negative feedback loop in the model. If the food supply is
constant, the nutrition surplus will decrease as the population increases. This
causes an increase in the death rate that in turn lowers the population.
Popu
Births
Birth Rate
Deaths
lation 
Nutritional
Needs
Death Rate
Nutritional
Surplus
Food Supply
Figure 2.9: Causal-Loop Diagram
S-Shaped Population Growth
Figure 2.10 shows the limited loop translated into Stella II® format. Food
supply is an additional stock. Because it is constant, no flows exist.
Nutritional surplus and nutritional needs are both converter equations.
Within Stella II® converters may supply constant variables, perform
mathematical calculations, or provide a graphical relation between two
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variables. In Fig. 2.10, nutritional needs and nutritional surplus perform
calculations, per capita food requirements provides a constant variable, and
death fraction relates nutritional surplus graphically to the death fraction.
The additional mathematical expressions for this sections are listed below. (S -
Stock, O - Equation or Graphical Converter, C - Constant Variable Converter)
O Nutritional Needs = Population * Per Capita Food Requirement
O Nutritional Surplus = Food Supply / Nutritional Needs
O Death Fraction = Graph (Nutritional Surplus)
(0.0, 0.700), (1.0, 0.285), (2.0, 0.159), (3.0, 0.123), (4.0, 0.109), (5.0, 0.109),
(6.0, 0.105), (7.0, 0.104), (8.0, 0.103), (9.0, 0.102), (10.0, 0.100)
S Food Supply
Initial Conditions: 6 Million Tons of Food
C Per Capita Food Requirement = 1 Ton per person per year
Population
Per Capita
Figure 2.10: Stella II Diagram
S-Shaped Population Growth
Figure 2.11 shows the results including a limited food supply. Initially, when
the surplus is large, the population grows exponentially. However, as the
population grows, the surplus of food decreases. Consequently, the death rate
rises and eventually takes control of the population growth. The result is an
S-shaped population curve: exponential growth followed by an exponential
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approach to a fixed population. The limited food supply eventually
constrains population growth.
1 Population
1*
1:
1:
0.00 6.25 12.50 18.75 25.00
a Years 11:01 8/2/93
Figure 2.11: Population Growth
S-Shaped Growth
2.4 Model Validation
"The validity [or significance] of a model should be judged by its
suitability for a particular purpose." (Forrester 1961, p. 115)
Models simulate reality. When functioning of the world is questioned, a
model may be developed so as to avoid the time, expense, danger, or efforts
involved in building, testing, and modifying the world on a real time basis.
Yet, when reality is only simulated will meaningful information be obtained?
Because modelers, managers, and policy makers seek to guide future
decisions with the knowledge gained from the model, validity presents an
important issue. However, what constitutes validity remains somewhat
controversial in the modeling community. Many have advocated "formal,
objective, quantitative model validation procedures" to assure the scientific
integrity of the modeling process and have criticized the system dynamicist
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for not employing such techniques. "System dynamicists have responded by
stating that model validity is strongly tied to the nature and context of the
problem, the purpose of the model, the background of the user, the
background of the analyst, and other considerations. Accordingly, model
validation is inherently a social, judgmental, qualitative process: models
cannot be proved valid but can be judged to be so." (Barlas and Carpenter
1990, p. 148)
Less formal, qualitative validation procedures provide an attractive
methodology for the system dynamics method because of the type of
problems typically studied. Unlike physical and engineering models, system
dynamics models are routinely built to simulate social systems where
quantitative data is less available and less reliable than in the physical
sciences. Consequently, modelers and decision makers must place greater
reliance upon judgment as to the usefulness of the simulation. As Forrester
comments, "the pertinent test is that of utility in improving ... practice[s]."
Does the simulation and modeling process provide new insights into the
workings of the system and enable better practices and policies to be
developed and implemented? If so, then formal quantitative validation is of
less concern. Accuracy and precision are less meaningful for most social
models and could, in fact, be greatly misleading, as it would imply more
precise knowledge than could be justified.
A model is after all a simulation of reality. Its validity lies not in whether the
model is a perfect representation of reality but whether the representation can
meet its intended purpose: to be useful in solving the proposed problem.
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Chapter 3
3.0 Social Pressure, Safety Regulation Model
System dynamics presents a modeling tool well adapted for simulating the
functions of complex social systems. Of importance to this thesis is how the
social system relates to the nuclear power industry. A complex relationship
exists between the public and a nuclear power plant; the performance and
even the concept of the nuclear plant triggers concerns and, ultimately,
actions within the public which are directed at altering the operations of that
plant. Responses from the nuclear plant may beget more action from the
public creating a loop of action and reaction with uncertain consequences. In
creating the Social Pressure, Safety Regulation Model, or SPSRM, this thesis
concentrates on the social system and its responses to nuclear performance.
Hopefully, such a model will provide greater insight into the social functions
regarding the nuclear industry. The following sections will first describe the
model system and its boundaries, followed by a presentation of the causal
relationships within that system, and finally the computer translation of the
system and its causality.
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3.1 System Boundaries
The Social Pressure, Safety Regulation Model concentrates upon the social
aspects of the nuclear industry, or system. Consequently, the operations of
the nuclear plant and activities of the nuclear industry are not within the
model's boundaries. Although plant performance and industry activities are
inputs, they are exogenous. No direct material or information flows or
decision mechanisms exist within the SPSRM to alter industry or plant
performance. (Although these paths exist, they are not within the scope of
this thesis.)
The boundaries of the SPSRM include the public, or social, mechanisms for
reacting to and altering nuclear performance. Social control of nuclear power
exist primarily through the Federal Government which maintains control of
nuclear regulation and oversight. The government body charged with these
duties is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) created from the Atomic
Energy Commission in 1974 by the Energy Reorganization Act. The NRC
creates and implements Federal Regulations and oversees the daily operation
of all nuclear power facilities within the United States. Since Congress
created the NRC specifying its authority, Congress remains a direct path for
public oversight of the Commission and its activities. The SPSRM
incorporates both Congress and the NRC as public controls within the
boundaries of the social system.
Although the government is the primary public link for altering nuclear
performance, it is not the only social structure actively influencing the
nuclear arena. The public at large is concerned over nuclear safety. They
perceive the risks associated with nuclear power and pressure government
and industry to act responsibly. Such pressure generally does not come from
individuals but rather from groups who form to further their social
objectives concerning nuclear power. These interest groups provide a
primary path for public action and are so represented within the SPSRM. The
public at large also remains within SPSRM boundaries as a source for social
perceptions and supporter of public action.
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However, the social structure does not operate on action alone. Information
transfer is paramount in the development of opinions which form the
foundations for action. Here, the media plays an important role. The mass
media, both print and electronic, keeps the public and government (especially
Congress) informed on issues concerning nuclear power, not only reporting
on nuclear performance but also on public actions and perceptions. The
media is integral to information flow within the SPSRM.
Congress, the NRC, the Public, Interest Groups, and the Media form the core
of the SPSRM. They define the social system which interacts with the nuclear
industry to alter nuclear operations. Other inputs such as plant performance,
industry lobbying and self regulation efforts, and private financial
foundations affect the system but are exogenous; no feedback mechanism
exist within the SPSRM to alter the levels of these inputs. (Such feedbacks
may exist in reality and, consequently, will be incorporated in the overall
model.)
3.2 Causal Relationships
What drives the public to be concerned or to seek change? What causes
system behavior? The social system consist of various groups and
organizations which act and react to information about the nuclear and social
systems. Such information causes people to act, and such causality forms the
basis of a model. The SPSRM emulates the cause and effect relationships
observed among the various sectors within the nuclear, social system. Those
causal structures direct the behavior of the model by specifying what
information affects whom and how. The following sections shall describe the
causal relationships constructed for each group within the SPSRM.
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3.2.1 The Public
Public Forgetting
+ \ Interest Group
Resources
Public Concern
Media Reporting
Interest Group
Actions
Industry Public Relations
Figure 3.1: Causal Loop Diagram
Public Concern
The public at large expresses concern over nuclear safety. Nuclear power
elicits certain fears and worries in the general public. Risk associated with
nuclear fission, images surrounding "nuclear power" including associations
with the bomb, fears of the unknowns of technology, and other motivators,
all drive public opinions relating to nuclear power. These opinions create
concern among some, and such concerns cause many to seek changes in
nuclear operations.
Within the SPSRM, the media, interest groups, industry public relations, and
time drive the level of public concern. The media dominates as a public
source of information. However, the media cannot report everything; it
selectively reports those items which it deems newsworthy. Regarding a
nuclear power plant, newsworthy tends to center around unusual events ---
especially those which may affect the health and safety of the public.
Consequently, media attentions generally increases nuclear concerns. (No
criticism intended; it is simply an observation of what people generally
consider as important.)
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Because the level of public concern greatly affects an interest group's level of
support, such groups actively seek to raise public concern. Mailings, protest,
etc. are various means for directly converting people to a group's cause. Like
interest groups, the utility maintains a vested interest in public support.
Consequently, they too actively seek to alter public concern, trying through
public relations and information efforts to lower concern and build support
for continued nuclear operations. Time is the final driver. People forget
mailings and events; consequently, with time a natural decay of concern
occurs.
3.2.2 Interest Groups
Foundation
Support
Interest Group Congressional
Interest Group CongressionalResources
Public Concern
* ·1h_ +
Concern
+E
Interest Group - NRC
Actions + Concern
Media Reporting Industry
Performance
Figure 3.2: Causal Loop Diagram
Interest Groups
Groups develop to further a variety of interests. The nuclear industry is not
unique in that aspect. Both existing and newly developed organizations
express desires to alter the nuclear utility. Some seek to eliminate nuclear
reactors, others simply to improve performance and safety. As stated before,
public action occurs through interest groups. Concern supports the interest
groups, but it is the groups which influence the government and utility.
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Financial resources enable such groups to function. It is the primary driver of
group actions. Two sources of support exist: private foundations and the
public. Public support is directly coupled to concern. As concern rises,
financial donations to support group actions increase. Conversely, such
support decreases if concern lessens. Although foundation support may in
some manor be tied to public concern, here it is considered independent and
constant.
Although the financial resources limit group actions, events within the
nuclear industry directly affect the rate, efficiency, and timing of such
expenditures. An accident at any nuclear plant elicits an immediate response
from interest groups to highlight the potential consequences of nuclear
reactor operation. Events increase the rate of spending of available moneys
and produce efforts to spend more efficiently.
3.2.3 Congress
The legal mandate for government involvement in the nuclear industry
originates in the U.S. Congress. It writes the laws which create both
regulations and regulators. Consequently, Congress exhibits much influence
upon the industry both directly in the laws passed and indirectly through the
commentary of individual lawmakers.
In the SPSRM, the legal framework is a given. No structure for creating laws
is included. However, Congress does alter NRC actions. As Congressional
Concern increases, lawmakers place additional pressure upon the NRC to
assure nuclear safety: see Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 shows the causal relationships affecting Congress. The public,
through interest groups; the nuclear industry; the media; the NRC; and time
all contribute to Congressional Concern. Interest groups and the industry
both lobby Congress, trying to persuade lawmakers toward their views:
interest groups trying to heighten concern while the industry tries to lessen
concern and build confidence in nuclear safety. The media helps keep
Congress informed of happenings within the industry and the public
40
sentiment. As with the public, media reports tends to increase Congressional
Concern. Somewhat unique to the government, including Congress, is the
NRC's impact at alleviating concern. The NRC's mandate is to assure
nuclear safety and actions taken towards those ends help alleviate
Congressional worries over safety. Again like the public, Congress forgets;
nuclear concern diminishes as other issues surface and nuclear issues fade.
Media Renortina
Foundation
Support
+
Public Concern
Industry Pt
Relations 
Lobbying
Interest Gre
Resources
7+ n
Interest Group Co
Actions + C\
\ V+ 
LA J:.. .IVltUld
Reporting -
ingressic
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nal + NRC Concern
NRC Actions
2
Industry
Performance
Figure 3.3: Causal Loop Diagram
Social Pressure / Safety Regulation
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3.2.4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Since government oversight falls to the NRC, all efforts at guiding
government nuclear policy ultimately target this agency. Efforts to influence
and inform the agency plus its own efforts at oversight all impact NRC
concern for nuclear safety. It is this concern which drives the agency's actions
to assure safety.
Because the NRC seeks safety in nuclear operations, concern is directly
coupled to plant performance. Not only do accidents and major events cause
concern to rise, but any information which indicates a higher probability of
such an occurrence also increases NRC concern. Three sources inform the
NRC of industry performance: normal utility to NRC communications,
License Event Reports, and-utility informants. On a routine basis, nuclear
plants supply reports and operating updates to the NRC. Such information
may heighten or lesson concern depending on what level of utility
performance is indicated. If a deviation from technical specifications occurs,
utilities must file a License Event Report (as mandated by 10 CFR 50) with the
NRC; such reports increase concern because they indicate a deviation from
normal operation. Finally, personnel within a nuclear facility may contact
the NRC to inform them of potential hazards at the plant. Such information
increases concern.
NRC policies and perceptions of such policies affect the interest of various
groups associated with the nuclear industry. Because of this, several groups
actively seek to alter NRC policy by presenting differing perspectives on NRC
actions, utility performance, and operating consequences. If a group succeeds,
such presentations may alter NRC concern and guide NRC action. In the
SPSRM, such groups are either 1) interest groups which campaign to raise
NRC concern and government oversight or 2) industry associations --
represented by the Nuclear Management and Resource Council (NUMARC)
-- which seek to lesson NRC concern by demonstrating the industries
commitment to safe operation.
Congress also seeks to guide NRC policy and actions, especially when
Congressional concern over nuclear issues is heightened: such actions
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increase NRC concern. Finally, the media affects NRC concern. Although
not actively seeking changes in the NRC, media articles reflect the public
attitudes over nuclear power, attracting NRC attention and tending to
increase concern since most articles bend toward the negative on nuclear
power.
The NRC's own actions also alleviates concern. By acting, the NRC counters
the causes which originally drove its concern.
3.2.5 Media
Public Concern
Interest Group
Actions
+
Media Reporting
+
+!
Industry Performance
(LERs, Information,
Informants)
Congressional
Concern
NRC
Concern
+
Figure 3.4: Causal Loop Diagram
Media Reporting
The media represents the prime source of information for many, especially
the public and Congress. (The NRC and interest groups maintain direct
sources of industry information.) The media seeks information from
multiple sources and reports such information when of sufficient quality to
warrant news. Interest group actions, industry events, utility reports, plant
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informants, and Congressional releases all provide information to the media.
Information varies on news worthiness, and only such information
considered of high quality and news worthiness is actually reported --
independent of the slant of such information but recognizing that harm or
potential harm qualifies more often as news as opposed to normal conditions.
3.3 Computer Representation
To simulate the SPSRM, the system along with its causality must be
structured in the language of mathematics. This allows for the integration of
the system over time to study the dynamics of system behavior. It also
enables the modeler and the critic to view the system under the precise rule
of mathematical logic: the mathematics remove the ambiguities and
assumptions which sometimes remain clouded in verbal descriptions.
Additionally, structuring the model as such provides the ability to utilize
digital computers to quicken and ease the simulation process. The SPSRM
has been written using Stella II, a system dynamics software package for
Macintosh Computers.
To provide a logical format, the SPSRM has been divided into seven sectors.
Five follow the subdivisions in the previous causal relations section: Public,
Interest Groups, Congress, NRC, and the Media. Exogenous inputs are
included in another sector, and a final sector covers miscellaneous
calculations. A graphical, written, and mathematical description of each
sector follows, including a breakdown of the modeling structure: stocks (S),
converters (0), and constants (C).
3.3.1 Public Sector
The public sector simulates the general public. It expresses public concern and
the public support such concern implies. As stated previously, concern
represents the fears and worries the general public expresses over nuclear
power operations. To represent this, the SPSRM divides the U.S. population
into two groups: those concerned about nuclear power and those
44
unconcerned. Those who seek greater oversight and/or elimination of
nuclear power reside in the concerned population while those who support
or are neutral on nuclear power reside in the unconcerned population. It is
not to say that the unconcerned population have no worries, but they are
generally supportive and not actively against nuclear power.
From the causal structure, concerned individuals support interest group
activities. Such support appears as monetary donations to finance interest
group activities, and a portion of the concerned public will express that
concern through donations.
IG Completed Actions Media Articles
Figure 3.5: Stella Diagram
Public Sector
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3.3.1.1 Stocks and Flows
The SPSRM represents the two population groups as levels: the concerned
public and unconcerned public. People may flow from one group to the other
-- concerned or unconcerned -- as determined by Public Converting, a rate
calculation dependent upon the passage of time and the external forces which
influence each population group. To start the simulation, an initial state of
ten percent concerned and ninety percent unconcerned is given.
3.3.1.1.1 Stock and Flow Equations
S Concerned Public(t) = Concerned Public(t - dt) + (Public Converting) *
dt
Initial Conditions: Concerned Public = .10 * Population Size
Inflows:
1. Public Converting = Public Influencing - Public Forgetting
S Unconcerned Public(t) = Unconcerned Public(t - dt) - (Public
Converting) * dt
Initial Conditions: Unconcerned Public = .90 * Population Size
Outflows:
1. Public Converting = Public Influencing - Public Forgetting
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Stock Units Inflow Outflow Units
Concerned People Public Public People /
Public Converting Converting Month
Unconcerned People Public Public People /
Public Converting Converting Month
3.3.1.2 Converters
Two conversion calculations, Public Influencing and Public Forgetting,
combine to form the conversion rate (public converting) between concerned
and unconcerned individuals. Public Influencing combines the effects of
Media Articles, Interest Group Actions, and Nuclear Industry Public Relations
in converting individuals between the two populations. Public Forgetting
accounts for the dissipation of concern through the passage of time: memory
of the incidents and information which converted individuals fades with
time, after which some shall no longer remained concerned.
Public Donations, the third converter, calculates the public's financial support
of the interest group activities. The only action and primary influence of the
public sector, Public Donating takes the Average Public Donation and the
Public Donating Fraction to calculate the interest group support from the
concerned population.
3.3.1.2.1 Converter Equations
O Public Donating = Concerned Public * Ave Public Donation * Public
Donating Fraction
O Public Forgetting = Concerned Public / Public Memory
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Converter Units Inputs
Public Influencing People / Month 1. Media Articles
2. IG Completed Action
3. Ind Pub Rel
4. Concerned Public
5. Unconcerned Public
Public Forgetting People / Month 1. Concerned Public
.......................... ,..........2. Public Memory
Public Donating Dollars / Month 1. Concerned Public
2. Ave Public Donation
3. Pub Donating Fract
O Public Influencing = ((IG Completed Actions * Unconcerned Public) +
(Media Articles * Unconcerned Public) - (IndPubRel * Concerned
Public)) * Public Constant
3.3.1.3 Constants
Constants Units
Public Memory Months
Average Public Donation Dollars / Month
Public Donating Fraction People Donating / Concerned
People
Public Constant % Converted / Action
Public Memory supplies the average time, in months, required for converting
efforts and information to fade from individual memory. Average Public
Donation gives the average donation, in dollars per month, received by
interest groups from the Concerned Public. The Public Donating Fraction
provides the fraction of the Concerned Public who donate money to interest
groups, given that all those concerned may not donate. And the Public
Constant specifies the percent of people converted by each action which
influences people to convert.
3.3.1.3.1 Constant Values
C Ave Public Donation = 1
C Public Donating Fraction = .0025
C Public Memory = 12
C Public Constant = 1/1000
3.3.1.4 External Variables
External Variable Source Sector
I G Completed Actions Interest Group
Media Articles Media
Industry Public Relations Exogenous
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Interest group actions, media articles, and industry public relations all
combine to influence people to convert from one group to the other --
concerned to unconcerned and vice versa.
3.3.2 Interest Group Sector
l RPQ_ FoundationBacking
Figure 3.6: Stella Diagram
Interest Group Sector
The Interest Group Sector represents public action. It simulates interest group
activities, the primary function of which is to influence the opinions and
actions of others. Groups rather than individuals provide the path for public
participation in the nuclear industry. Within this model, no other path exist
for the public to alter the actions of the government and utility.
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Although the sector models interest group actions, it does not track
individual group action or development. Interest group resources and
actions represent the collective efforts of all interest groups.
3.3.2.1 Stocks and Flows
The causality section distinguishes interest group resources as a driver of
interest group actions, which then influence others. Here stocks represent
both resources and actions: resources being covered with a single stock while
actions are disaggregated into two.
Donated dollars flow into IG Resources where they are held, as in a bank
account, until spent for group actions or group maintenance, i.e. overhead.
As the reservoir of available funds, IG Resources financially bounds the
activities of the interest group sector. The activities themselves are tracked
through the levels, IG Actions in Progress and IG Completed Actions. Groups
spend resources to initiate actions which are accounted for within Actions in
Progress until such actions are completed or discarded. To influence others,
actions must be completed and reside within the level IG Completed Actions.
Here actions remain until their influence has subsided, a duration set by
Lapse Time.
The several levels within this structure help simulate the delays and drains
viewed in the world of group action and behavior. Influence is not
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Stocks Units Inflow Outflow Units
IG Dollars IG Funding IG Spending Dollars /
Resources Month
IG Actions Actions IG Action 1. IG Acting Actions /
in Progress Initiation 2. Task Month
Abandoning
IG Actions IG Acting Lapsing Actions /
Completed Month
Actions
immediate with donations nor do all resources ultimately affect designated
targets: public, Congress, NRC.
3.-3.2.1.1 Stock and Flow Equations
S IG Resources(t) = IG Resources(t - dt) + (IG Funding - IG Upkeeping -
IG Spending) * dt
Initial Conditions: IG Resources = FoundationBacking + Public
Donating
Inflows:
1. IG Funding = Public Donating + FoundationBacking
Outflows:
1. IG Spending = IG Resources / Spend Time
2. IG Upkeeping = IG Resources / (3*Base Time)
S IG Actions In Progress(t) = IG Actions In Progress(t - dt) + (IG Action
Initiation - IG Acting - TaskAbandoning) * dt
Initial Conditions: IG Actions In Progress = 50
Inflows:
1. IG Action Initiation = IG Spending * ResActConv
Outflows:
1. IG Acting = (IG Actions In Progress / TaskDuration)
2. TaskAbandoning = IG Actions In Progress / (4 * TaskDuration)
S IG Completed Actions(t) = IG Completed Actions(t - dt) + (IG Acting -
Lapsing) * dt
Initial Conditions: IG Completed Actions = 10
Inflows:
1. IG Acting = (IG Actions In Progress / TaskDuration)
Outflows:
1. Lapsing = IG Complete Actions / Lapse Time
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3.3.2.2 Converters
Converters within the interest group sector combine to calculate the rate at
which dollars are spent to initiate group actions and the impact per dollar that
the spending may produce. Industry performance, here in terms of size and
quantity of events, affects the rate and conversion of dollars to actions. LERs
drive the Event Multiplier, which alters both the base rate of spending,
calculated in Spend Time, and the base conversion of dollars to actions,
calculated in Resource-Action Conversion. This structure simulates a groups
efforts to utilize an event to highlight their concerns: an accident re-enforces
peoples concern over nuclear power and the model accelerates interest group
activities to publicize such events.
3.3.2.2.1 Converter Equations
O EventMultiplier = GRAPH(LERs)
Points:
(0.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.10), (30.0, 1.25), (40.0, 1.40), (50.0, 1.60),
(60.0, 2.00), (70.0, 2.60), (80.0, 3.45), (90.0, 5.30), (100, 10.0)
O ResActConv = Base Conversion * EventMultiplier
O SpendTime = Base Time / EventMultiplier
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Converter Units Inputs
Event Multiplier Dimensionless LERs
Spend Time Months 1. Base Time
2. Event Multiplier
Resource-Action Dollars / Action 1. Base Conversion
Conversion 2. Event Multiplier
3.3.2.3 Constants
Constants Units
Base Time Months
Base Conversion Dollars / Action
Task Duration Months
Lapse Time Months
Constants control flow rates to and from the various levels. Base Time
supplies the base rate of resource spending; Base Conversion relates dollars to
actions; Task Duration gives the average project length; and Lapse Time
specifies the average time for which a completed action shall continue to
influence other sectors.
3.3.2.3.1 Constant Values
C Base Conversion = .0001
C Base Time = 6
C Lapse Time = 1
C TaskDuration = 4
3.3.2.4 External Variables
Money and industry performance drive interest group behavior. Money
flows from private foundations and the public to support interest group
activities, which are a response to the group's concern over nuclear power.
Because accidents and other major events highlight group concerns, industry
performance, here represented by LERs, significantly accelerates group actions.
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External Variable Source Sector
Public Donating Public
Foundation Backing _Exoenous
LERs Exogenous
3.3.3 Congressional Sector
IG Completed Actions IndPubRel
Figure 3.7: Stella Diagram
Congressional Sector
Congress represents the elected government and is consequently subject to
social persuasion. Because Congress also oversees the NRC, it is a conduit for
public pressure to influence nuclear regulatory policies. Social and industry
persuasion affects Congressional concern, which is treated much the same as
public concern: i.e. concerned and unconcerned lawmakers. Concerned
implies that lawmakers are worried about public health and safety in regards
to nuclear power. It also implies that nuclear power is of great enough
interest to warrant a lawmakers time and efforts. Like the concerned public,
concerned lawmakers influence others -- here the NRC through contact and
pressure to alter regulatory practices.
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3.3.3.1 Stocks and Flows
Like the general public, two levels track concerned and unconcerned
lawmakers, who may be converted from one group to the other by external
influences and time.
3._3.3.1.1 Stock and Flow Equations
S Concerned L.mkrs(t) = Concerned Lmkrs(t - dt) + (C Converting) * dt
Initial Conditions: Concerned Lmkrs = .1 * Lawmakers
Inflows:
1. C Converting = C Persuading - C Forgetting - NRC Satisfying
S Unconcerned Lmkrs(t) = Unconcerned Lmkrs(t - dt) - (C Converting) *
dt
Initial Conditions: Congress = 0.9 * Lawmakers
Outflows:
1. C Converting = C Persuading - C Forgetting - NRC Satisfying
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Stock Unit Inflow Outflow Units
Unconcerne Lawmakers Congress Congress Lawmakers
d Congress . Converting Converting / Month
Concerned Lawmakers Congress Congress Lawmakers
Congress Converting Converting / Month
3.3.3.2 Converters
Converters calculate the influences upon lawmakers and the influences
exerted by lawmakers. Persuading, Forgetting, and NRC Satisfying all affect
the conversion of lawmakers between concerned and unconcerned groups.
Persuading adds the external effects of the media, interest groups, and the
industry. Forgetting calculates the concerns which dissipate with the passage
of time. NRC Satisfying calculates the impact of NRC actions upon concerned
lawmakers: regulatory action alleviates some lawmaker concerns.
Lawmaker Pressure and Congressional Releases both calculate Congressional
impacts. Pressure represents the initiatives of Congress to alter NRC
behavior and is a function of concerned lawmakers, active fraction, and
action frequency. Congressional Releases represents the quantity of
Congressional correspondence with the media and is simply a linear function
of concerned lawmakers.
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Converter Units Inputs
C Persuading Lawmakers / Month 1. Ind Pub Relations
2. IG Completed
Actions
3. Media Articles
C Forgetting Lawmakers / Month 1. Concerned
Lawmakers
2. C Memory
NRC Satisfying Lawmakers / Month 1. Concerned Lmkrs
2. NRC Action
Lawmaker Pressure Initiatives / Month 1. Concerned Lmkrs
2. Active Fraction
3. Action Frequency
Congressional Releases / Month 1. Lawmaker Pressure
Releases
Converter Equations
O C Forgetting = Concerned Lmkrs / C Memory
O C Persuading = (((IG Completed Actions + Media Articles) *
Unconcerned Lmkrs) - (IndPubRel * Concerned Lmkrs)) * C Constant
O NRC Satisfying = (NRC Acting * Concerned Lmkrs) * NRC Affect
O lmkr pressure = Concerned Lmkrs * ActiveFraction * ActionFrequency
O CongressReleases = .1 * lmkr pressure
3.3.3.3 Constants
Congressional Memory supplies the average time, in months, for concerns to
dissipate simply as a function of time. Both Active Fraction and Action
Frequency affect lawmaker pressure, specifying the fraction of concerned
lawmakers who actually take initiatives to influence the NRC and the
average frequency of such initiatives. Both the Congressional Constant and
the NRC Affect relate the ability of external influences and NRC actions to
convert lawmakers from concerned or unconcerned groups.
3.3.3.3.1 Constant Values
C ActionFrequency = .1
C ActiveFraction = .1
C C Memory = 12
C C Constant = 1/100
C NRC Affect = 1/10
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Constants Units
Conressional Memory ....... Months
Active Fraction Active Lmkrs / Concerned Lmkrs
Action Frequency Initiatives / Active Lmkrs /
Month
Congressional Constant % Converted / Action
NRC Affect % Converted / NRC Action
3.3.3.2.1
External Variables
External Variables Source Sector
Media Articles Media
IG Completed Actions Interest Group
Ind Pub Relations Exogenous
NRC Acting NRC
Because Congress is a path for influencing government nuclear policies, it is
affected by several groups. The public through interest groups and the media,
the industry, and the NRC all seek influence over Congressional attitudes
over nuclear safety.
3.3.4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sector
IG Completed Actions Media Articles
LERs
NRC Sector
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3.3.3.4
The NRC implements government policy concerning nuclear safety. Its
objective is to assure public safety in regards to nuclear power operations, and
to achieve this it actively regulates the industry. NRC actions including
regulation vary with the agency's level of concern over nuclear safety. As
stated previously, such concern is primarily driven by industry performance,
but also affected by the media and groups which seek to alter agency policies.
Although NRC actions directly affect plant operations and performance, such
impacts are external to the SPSRM and consequently not simulated here.
3.3.4.1 Stocks and Flows
Two types of stocks are present in the NRC sector: concern and action.
Concern is the driver of all NRC action. It is an artificial scale from zero to
one hundred where zero concern leads to no actions -- no new regulations --
and one hundred concerns prompts the shutdown of all U.S. nuclear power
plants. The level of concern is affected by industry performance, social and
political pressure, industry safety efforts, and the NRC's own actions.
Concern drives the rate of inquiring -- investigating potential safety items --
which begins a series of NRC actions that may eventually lead to regulatory
changes. Inquiring accumulates processed information, data from both
industry records and investigator efforts covering the point of inquiry. A
portion of this information shall be reported to the industry in the form of
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Stock Units Inflows Outflows Units
NRC Concern NRC NRC Concerns /
Concern Thinking Thinking Action
NRC Pages NRC NRC Pages /
Processed Inquiring Reporting Month
Info
NRC Report Pages NRC NRC Pages /
Info Reporting Regulating Month
NRC Pages NRC Regulation Pages /
Regulation Regulating Discarding Month
information notices, maintenance reports, etc. Such reports accumulate in
the Reported Information Level where with time they may lead to regulation
development. The Regulation level hold pages of regulation until such time
that it is discarded (currently that is never). All action levels are in pages of
information, reports, or regulations, and set conversions relate pages of one
to pages of the other.
3.3.4.1.1 Stock and Flow Equations
S NRC Concern(t) = NRC Concern(t - dt) + (NRC Thinking) * dt
Initial Conditions: NRC Concern = 3
Inflows:
1. NRC Thinking = ((Informing + Influencing - NRC Acting) * NRC
Concern) / (NRC Constant)
S NRC Processed Info(t) = NRC Processed Info(t - dt) + (NRC Inquiring -
NRC Reporting) * dt
Initial Conditions: NRC Processed Info = 5
Inflows:
1. NRC Inquiring = (NRC Concern / InqTime) * Concern Multiplier
Outflows:
1. NRC Reporting(o) = (NRC Processed Info / Reptime) * Concern
Multiplier
S NRC Report Info(t) = NRC Report Info(t - dt) + (NRC Reporting -
NRC Regulating) * dt
Initial Conditions: NRC Report Info = 5
Inflows:
1. NRC Reporting(i) = NRC Reporting(o) * Conversion multiplier
Conversion multiplier = 0.5
Outflows:
1. NRC Regulating(o) = (NRC Report Info / RegTime) * Concern
Multiplier
S NRC Regulation(t) = NRC Regulation(t - dt) + (NRC Regulating -
Reg Discarding) * dt
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3.3.4.2
Initial Conditions: NRC Regulation = 10
Inflows:
1. NRC Regulating(i) = NRC Regulating(o) * Conversion multiplier
Conversion multiplier = 0.1
Outflows:
1. Reg Discarding = Discard Fraction * NRC Regulation
Converters
Informing, Influencing, and Acting all calculate the various impacts on NRC
Thinking, the rate of changing concern. Informing covers the direct sources
of information on plant performance: i.e. License Event Reports, Utility
Information, and utility Informants. Persuasion falls within the influencing
calculation. Congress, interest groups, NUMARC activities, and the media
directly and indirectly persuade NRC thinking. Since the NRC inquires,
reports, and regulates in response to concerns, actions designed to correct
those concerns -- the reports and regulations -- also alleviate that concern
over time.
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Converter Units Inputs
Informing Concerns / Month 1. LERs
2. Utility Info
3. Informants
Influencing Concerns / Month 1. Lmkrs Pressure
2. IG Completed Acts.
3. Media Articles
4. NUMARC
NRC Acting Concerns / Month 1. NRC Regulation
2. NRC Report Info
3. NRC Act Influ
Time
Concern Multiplier Unitless 1. NRC Concern
While the above calculations affect the level of concern, the Concern
Multiplier alters the impact of NRC Concern. A general rise in concern not
only increases the agency's inquiring but also accelerates the development of
reports and regulations which are already in the pipeline. The multiplier
correlates concern with the inquiring, reporting, and regulating rates.
3.3.4.2.1 Converter Equations
O Influencing = ((IG Completed Actions * .25) + (Media Articles * .25) +
(lmkr pressure) - (NUMARC)) / 1
O Informing = Informants + LERs - UtilityInfo
O NRC_Acting = ((NRC Report Info * .1) + (NRC Regulation)) / NRC
Act Influ Time
O Concern Multiplier = GRAPH(NRC Concern)
Points:
(0.00, 0.1), (10.0, 3.00), (20.0, 5.45), (30.0, 7.20), (40.0, 8.20), (50.0, 9.00), (60.0,
9.40), (70.0, 9.65), (80.0, 9.80), (90.0, 9.95), (100, 10.0)
3.3.4.3 Constants
Constants Units
Inquiry Time Months
Report Time Months
Regulation Time Months
Discard Time Months
NRC Action Influence Time Months
NRC Constant % Concerns / Action
Constants within this sector provide the various time variables for the
different rate equations. Inquiry time provides the average number of
months required to collect processed information. The average time to take
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processed information and release it in a report format is given by Report
Time, while the average time for transforming the issues presented by reports
into regulation is Regulation Time. Discard Time is the average span which
regulations remain on the books: currently considered to be infinite.
Reports and regulation also alleviate the concerns which prompted their
development. The average time for this process is given by the NRC Action
Influence Time.
3.3.4.3.1 Constant Variables
C Discard Fraction = 0
C InqTime = 6
C NRC Act Influ Time = 2
C NRC Constant = 100
C Regtime = 24
C Reptime = 6
3.3.4.4 Exogenous Variables
External Variables Source Sector
LERs Exogenous
Utility Information Exogenous
Informants Exogenous
Lawmaker Pressure Congressional
IG Completed Actions Interest Group
Media Articles Media
NUMARC Exogenous
Since the NRC implements government nuclear policies, all efforts and
activities which might influence that policy affect the NRC in some manor.
Efforts include any groups seeking influence over nuclear policy, and
activities include the day to day experience of the industry.
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3.3.5 Media
CongressReleases ReleaseQuality
Informants InfoQuality IG Completed Actions
Figure 3.9: Stella Diagram
Media Sector
The media transmits information. Although the NRC and interest groups
maintain their own information channels, both the public and Congress
receive most nuclear information from the media, making it significant
player in the development of public and Congressional opinion. As stated
earlier, the media does not create news, but not all information is considered
news. The choice of what information to report gives the media tremendous
influence.
3.3.5.1 Stocks and Flows
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Stocks Units Inflow Outflow Units
Media Articles Media News Articles /
Articles Reporting Lapsing Month
The media sector includes only one level, media articles. It collects reported
articles holding them while they remain in public memory. When such
articles are forgotten and no longer influence opinion, they lapse from
memory and flow out of media articles.
3.3.5.1.1 Stock and Flow Equations
Media Articles(t) = Media Articles(t - dt) + (Media Reporting - News
Lapsing) * dt
Initial Conditions: Media Articles = 1
Inflows:
1. Media Reporting = (UtilityNews + CongressNews + EventNews +
InsideNews + IGNews)
Outflows:
1. News Lapsing = Media Articles / News Lapse Time
Converters
* Event Newsworth is a converter switch
event. Scaling is a random function which
used to help simulate a major
is normally utilized to specific
LER news quality; Event Newsworth switches scaling off if a large event is
inputted into the program.
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3.3.5.2
Converters Units In uts
IG News Articles / Month 1. IG Completed Acts.
2. Newsworthiness
Inside News Articles / Month 1. Informants
2. Info Quality
Event News Articles / Month 1. LERs
2. Event Newsworth
Utility News Articles / Month 1. Utility Info
2. Positiveness
Congress News Articles / Month 1. Congress Releases
2. Release Quality
Event Newsworth * Articles / Event 1. Step Event
2. Scaling
All converter equations within the media sector take the quantity and quality
terms of information to calculate the number of articles generated by each
information source. Not all information shall be news worthy; currently,
several random functions generate quality terms which scale the rate of
article generation.
3.3.4.2.1 Converter Equations
O CongressNews = ReleaseQuality * CongressReleases
O EventNews = LERs * EventNewsworth
O IGNews = Newsworthiness * IG Completed Actions
O InsideNews = Informants * InfoQuality
O UtilityNews = Positiveness * UtilityInfo
3.3.5.3 Constants
News Lapse Time is the only constant term within the media sector and
represents the average time, in months, which a news article will remain in
public memory.
C News Lapse Time = .5
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3.3.5.4 External Variables
External Variables Source Sector
IG Completed Actions Interest Group
Newsworthiness *  
Informants Exogenous
Info Quality 
__ _
LERs Exogenous
Step Event Exogenous
Scaling **
Utility Info Exogenous
Positiveness **
Con gressional Releases Congressional
Release Quality * **
·** Random functions are used to calculate the quality of provided
information. Each information source has an accompanying quality function,
generally a random variable between zero and one.
The -external variables tied to the media sector are either the information
sources from the other sectors or the quality functions accompanying that
information. The sources of media articles are interest group activities,
Congressional releases, utility information, utility informants, and license
event reports. Interest group and Congressional sources are internal to the
model while the remaining information is supplied as exogenous inputs
which are by definition not in a closed loop and not themselves affected by
media articles.
3.3.5.4.1 External Functions
Random scaling functions simulate news quality of the information being
supplied to the media. Such function general vary between zero and one,
adjusting the quantity of news articles from the sources of information.
O EventNewsworth = If (Scaling+StepEvent) > .5 then 1 else 0
O InfoQuality = RANDOM(0,1,5)
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O Newsworthiness = RANDOM(0,1,6)
O Positiveness = RANDOM(-.25,1,13)
O ReleaseQuality = RANDOM(0,1,6)
3.3.6 Exogenous Sector
Figure 3.10: Stella Diagram
Exogenous Sector
The exogenous sector contains the external constants which operate upon the
SPSRM. Included in this group of factors are variables representing license
event reports, industry public relations efforts, utility operating information,
informant frequency, NUMARC activities, Foundations Support for interest
groups, population of the U.S. and the size of Congress. Below are the
variable values.
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1[~P [il Exogenous Inputs
0 Local LERs
IndPubRel
0 National LERs
UtilityInfo
NUMARC Population Size Lawmakers
O O O
Informants FoundationBacking Initial NRC Info
lInitial Media Articles
Initial IG Levels
Exogenous Constants
Foundation Backing
Informants
Lawmakers
Local LERs
National LERs
NUMARC
Population Size
Utility Info
3.3.6.1
Units
Dollars / Month
Informant / Month
Lawmakers
Licensed Event Reports / Month
Licensed Event Reports / Month
Actions / Month
People
Pages / Month
Exogenous Values
C FoundationBacking = 5E4
C Informants = 1
C LocalLERs = 1
C National LERs = 10
C NUMARC = 4
C UtilityInfo -= 1
C Lawmakers = 535
C Population_Size = 250E6
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3.3.7 Miscellaneous Calculations
Figure 3.11: Stella Diagram
Miscellaneous Calculations
Currently, only license event reports are calculated within this section. Both
the number and magnitude of LERs are combined to develop a quantity
representing events. When testing various scenarios, this section is also
utilized for inputting large or unusual perturbations into the system: i.e.
major accidents, etc.
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Chapter 4
4.0 SPSRM Simulations
The SPSRM has been constructed so as to simulate the dynamics of the real
nuclear, social system. The process of simulation occurs by integrating the
system equations over a period of time, recording the paths of levels and rates
so as to observe the system's dynamic behavior. If our model represents
reality, then such simulations will enable the study of the system under both
normal and hypothetical conditions. It provides a means to test theories of
system behavior and the consequences of changing controllable variables.
However, the modeling of system behavior should never be taken as a
prediction of the future. The precision of a model such as the SPSRM is not
to the predictive degree. In fact, numerical constants within the SPSRM have
not been validated with historical data. They have been estimated for
simulation purposes. Consequently, numerical output should be taken as
references for describing general behavior and not as facts. The SPSRM is
designed for studying general system dynamics and investigating how such
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dynamics vary with changes in system variables and structure. Any
significance placed on actual numerical output could be seriously misleading.
This chapter will present several SPSRM simulations in an effort to educate
the reader on the performance of the model. The intent is to observe how the
system behaves: its normal response, response to abnormal conditions, and
its sensitivity to system changes.
Within the text, all SPSRM variables (rates and levels) will not be presented
or discussed, only those which are necessary to adequately present model
behavior. Each simulations spans ten years. Integrations are by Euler's
method, with a delta time of one week. All graphical and tabular data will be
presented on a monthly basis.
4.1 Steady-State
Chapter 3 defined the SPSRM. But how does it behave? This section presents
a steady-state simulation, which is simply a system integration with constant
inputs representing what is considered normal nuclear and social
functioning. It is the model as presented in chapter 3. Such a simulation
demonstrates how the social system, public and government, operate when
the nuclear industry functions reasonably well with no major mishaps. It
could be expected that under such conditions public pressure and resulting
actions would be minimal and that the system would reach a constant pattern
of behavior. Whether such conditions have existed may be debatable, but
dynamics prior to the Three Mile Island accident, especially 1960's and early
1970's, might approximate such behavior.
4.1.1 System Overview
Although more detailed graphs will be utilized for highlighting sector
outputs under various simulations, a standard overview will be presented
here. Time series of four levels are graphed: Concerned Public, IG Completed
Actions, NRC Concern, and NRC Regulation. These levels provide a general
representation of the model, showing both public and government actions
and perceptions.
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Figure 4.1: Steady-State System Overview
The results shown in Fig. 4.1 indicate that the system remains fairly constant
and stable with a constant stimulus. With no abnormal events to stimulate
activity, concerns and actions become routine and relatively constant. The
number of concerned individuals stabilizes between 15 and 20% of the
population. Such constant support causes interest group activities to stabilize,
which, in turn, places relatively constant public pressure upon the
government. Since the industry is functioning well and public pressure is
slight, the NRC's concern maintains a gradual decline over the span of
simulation. Regulation increases but at a very slow pace -- less than 1% per
year. The increase stems from accumulated experience from the worldwide
nuclear industry.
Such a response seems plausible. With a well functioning industry,
confidence in industry performance would grow, creating little incentive to
dramatically alter regulations. Additionally, without a stimulus for
converting people, a core of concerned individuals would probably remain
but with little change.
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4.1.2 Levels and Rates
Although the levels shown remain relatively constant, flows of people,
actions, and concern still fluctuate. All that is required for a level to remain
relatively stable is that the sum of a level's inflow and outflow total to zero
on average. A look at the concerned public and public converting provides a
good demonstration, as shown in Fig. 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Steady-State Public Sector
Public converting appears somewhat erratic, but a careful observation shows
that it oscillates around zero, balancing a consistent but small conversion of
people from unconcerned to concerned and vice versa. (Note that public
converting represents both in and out flows whereas with some levels this is
split between two separate functions.) Under these "steady-state" conditions,
most levels within the SPSRM exhibit such behavior. The exceptions are
primarily NRC actions, regulating and regulation, and media articles, as
demonstrated by Fig. 4.3. Regulating fluctuates but is always positive, and
since discarding of regulation is zero, regulation always grows instead of
remaining constant. Media articles continually fluctuate because the drivers
for news quality are random functions constantly varying.
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As can be seen in Fig. 4.3, the level of media articles within public memory
always fluctuates, although small on average.
4.2 System Disturbance
If the world were perfect and no nuclear incidents occurred, a steady-state
response might be all that is required. But in fact, it is the incidents and
accidents, and the potential for such, which drive most social responses to the
nuclear industry. Consequently, of more importance is how the SPSRM
responds to a significant disturbance such as a major nuclear accident or
event. This section reviews such a response.
As discussed in chapter 3, the model incorporates events and incidents
through the reporting process mandated by 10 CFR 50 -- License Event
Reports. Within the model, the NRC, interest groups, and the media receive
LER notices: the NRC by law and interest groups and the media through
their own sources or through the Freedom of Information Act. LERs contain
both a frequency and scaling factor which combine to determine LER
influence. To simulate a major event, a one month impulse representing a
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single event with a scaling of 100 has been inputted. Such scaling represents a
site incident causing significant damage but no offsite harm. The event
occurs in month 50, and, as before, the simulation runs for 120 months.
4.2.1 System Overview
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Figure 4.4: Event Overview
4.2.1 System Overview
A comparison between the steady-state and event overviews in Fig. 4.4
reveals the significant impact which the input causes. Although the accident
simulates a site event only, any major nuclear incident raises the specter
which many envision from a nuclear event. Nuclear plants are built and
operated with the expectation that no harm will come to the public. When
an event posses that potential, public confidence is questioned, fears grow,
and pressure mounts for action to reassure public safety. The graph above
demonstrates the changes in public and government concern and the
resulting actions which follow the incident.
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1: NRC Concern 2: NRC Regulation
4.2.2 Public Response
1: Concerned Public 2: Public Converting
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Figure 4.5: Public Sector, Event
The origins of social pressure upon the nuclear industry lies with the general
public, whose concern supports public action which eventually may alter
government activities. Before the disturbance, the concerned population had
stabilized around 27 million individuals. Within one and a half months of
the event, public converting has risen from an average of zero to a peak of
18.8 million people/month. The concerned public peaks four and a half
months later, at month 56, when public converting becomes negative. At the
end of 120 months the level of concerned individuals is again stabilizing but
at 33.6 million people, 24% above pre-event.
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4.2.3 Interest Group Response
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Figure 4.6: Interest Group Sector, Event
Fig. 4.6 shows that prior to the event interest group completed actions had
stabilized around 7 per month. Note that these actions are the means of
public influence within the SPSRM. After the incident, actions soared
peaking at 89 two months later, then gradually declining to a level of 8.35 at
month 120. The sharp rise in interest group activity does not follow a sharp
rise in resources but, instead, increased spending of available dollars. Public
conversion and support are not instantaneous to the accident. Consequently,
if interest groups wish to utilize the event to highlight their concerns, they
must spend available resources immediately and utilize new donations as
received. Such strategy synergetically boost interest group influence since a
concerned Congress, NRC, and public are more receptive to public pressure
than when unconcerned.
78
"q 4
4.2.4 Congressional Response
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Figure 4.7: Concerned Congress with Concerned Public, Event
Congress responds much the same as the general public except that the swing
of concern is more pronounced -- both in amplitude and speed. It takes just 3
months for concerned lawmakers to peak at 325, rising from a steady-state
average of 70. Ten months later, less than 100 lawmakers are concerned, less
than 70 the following year. At the end of 120 months approximately 40
lawmakers remain concerned. The sharp rise and fall reflects the nature of
Congressional interest. The decline of Congressional concern below the pre-
event value occurs because the increased level of government regulation
eases many lawmakers' worries.
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4.2.5 NRC Response
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Figure 4.8: NRC Concern, Processed Information, Reported Information, &
Regulation; Event
The model's representation of the NRC shown in Fig. 4.8 demonstrates not
only the quantity of change that an event might initiate but also the lags
inherent between initiation and implementation. NRC concern begins to rise
immediately following the event peaking at 18, from an initial 2.5, one year
after the event. Processed information mirrors concern with about a month
lag. Reported information begins to rise about three month after the event
and peaks a year and a half later. The regulation rate begins to increase about
six months after the event and continues at an accelerated pace for about
three years. One large event triggers NRC concern which drives regulatory
actions for over four years, eventually doubling the level of regulation.
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4.2.6 Media Sector
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Figure 4.9: Media Articles with Media Reporting
Event
A nuclear accident is news. Because a catastrophic failure could cause serious
public harm, the media assumes responsibility for investigating and reporting
the story behind any major nuclear accident. Included is not only an effort to
present the facts of the accident, but to report various credible actors accounts
and concerns. Consequently, the event and the activities of interest groups,
which increase in response to the event, create a significant rise in media
reporting: peaking within the first month but remaining elevated for ten
months to a year.
4.3 Model Sensitivity
In the previous section, introducing a disturbance altered the dynamics of the
system. Rates changed, and levels followed different paths. In essence, the
model demonstrated its sensitivity to industry performance. But changing
any variable or structural tie might alter system behavior. Learning which
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components are integral to system behavior and within what ranges such
components can operate would enhance understanding of both the model
and the system, highlighting not only where the system might be
manipulated but also the models strengths and weakness in emulating
reality.
Three component types comprise the SPSRM: structural members such as
stocks, flows, and information transfers; exogenous variables such as industry
performance and activities; and system variables such as time constants and
conversion coefficients. This section presents simulations under a variety of
component situations. All simulations within this section retain the event as
inputted in section 4.2.
4.3.1 Structural Variations
It is not the intention of this section to rebuild the model but rather to
investigate the importance of two sectors by simulating the model without
their input. Although uncertain of the precise impact, the media and interest
groups wield significant influence within the nuclear, social system. To test
that influence, the following simulations are run without these sectors
(removed one at a time).
4.3.1.1 Media Sector
Figure 4.10 presents a simulation of the SPSRM with media reporting equal to
zero, effectively eliminating media articles from the model. With the
information which forms and reinforces opinions sharply curtained, fewer
concerns and actions develop, especially within the government. The event
alone initiates an increase in NRC concern, but without the media to drive
public concern and reinforce public pressure within Congress and the NRC,
there is little pressure for the NRC to greatly alter existing regulations.
Without social communications, the NRC's response to such an event need
not be as public as a change in regulation.
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The public sectors still react, but with much less fervor. Interest groups
receive event information and influence public, Congress and the NRC, but
without media reinforcement, such actions produce fewer results.
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Figure 4.11 presents a simulation with no interest group actions. (Here IG
Acting is set to zero.) Without the public action, which interest groups
represent, virtually no governmental action occurs as a result of the event.
There is simply no social pressure or public mandate to force additional
government oversight or regulation. Some public concern develops (small
perturbation) because the media reports the event, but with no groups to
publicize or advocate the potential harm of such an event, few means to raise
public concern exist.
Would the world mimic such simulations if no media or interest groups
existed? Perhaps not, but the dynamics of the former Soviet Union might
reinforce such a view of media and interest group influence upon the nuclear
system. Additionally, US history before anti-nuclear interest groups became
common might also correlate to such a perspective.
4.3.2 Exogenous Variable Sensitivity
The exogenous sector provides the inputs for utility and industry
performance, variables which affect the social system but -- within the SPSRM
-- are not themselves altered by social behavior. (As noted before, in the
larger nuclear system such variables are influenced by the social system's
behavior, but the SPSRM does not encompass such mechanisms.) This
section presents a series of sensitivity runs for each exogenous industry
variable. The runs compare how system levels change with varying
exogenous inputs. In each section which follows, the parameters variation
runs from one half to double the current parameter value.
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Figure 4.12: NRC Concern
Utility Information [.5, 1, 2]
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Figure 4.13: NRC Regulation
Utility Information [.5, 1, 2]
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On a routine basis, the utility provides a variety of information describing
plant conditions and operating history to the NRC. One premise of the
SPSRM is that cooperation between the NRC and the utility lessens NRC
concern over operations. Consequently, the behavior depicted in Figures 4.12
and 4.13 fits the expectation that a higher level of utility information would
lessen the rise of concern and regulation following a significant event. The
magnitude of change is small, however. Even though output varies ten to
fifteen percent, the halving and doubling of standard utility information does
not drastically alter system behavior.
4.3.2.2 NUMARC
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Figure 4.14: NRC Concern
NUMARC [2, 4, 8]
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Figure 4.15 NRC Regulation
NUMARC [2, 4, 8]
The Nuclear Management and Resource Council consolidates industry efforts
to communicate with the NRC. Within the SPSRM, NUMARC efforts build
NRC confidence in the industry, lowering the drive for additional regulation.
Figures 4.14 and 4.15 show that halving NUMARC activities more than
doubles NRC concern and regulation and doubling efforts almost eliminates
a rise in concern following an accident. Figure 4.14 also demonstrates the
time behavior of NRC concern. There is a general correlation between
amplitude and time response of NRC concern: as the amplitude of concern
increase the duration of elevated concern decreases and vice versa.
Note, however, that NUMARC efforts primarily affect the NRC only. Figure
4.16 below shows virtually no change in public concern as NUMARC
activities change.
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Figure 4.16 Public Concern
NUMARC [2, 4, 8]
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Figure 4.17 NRC Concern
Informants [ .5, 1, 2]
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Informants represent utility personnel who directly report their concerns
about plant safety and operation to the NRC. Such reports would naturally
increase NRC concern, as shown by the Fig. 4.17 above. What is interesting
though is that an increase in informants creates a much larger change in NRC
concern than does a decrease in such reports.
Because informants also speak to the press, they also have some impact upon
public concern, but as can be seen by Fig. 4.18, it is hardly noticeable.
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Figure 4.18: Public Concern
Informants [.5, 1, 2]
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Figure 4.19: NRC Concern
LERs [5, 10, 20]
LERs signify a deviation from technical specifications. An increase in such
reports indicates that utilities are having difficulty operating under specs and
implies a deterioration of safety. Figure 4.19 shows that a doubling of the
normal LER rate significantly increases concern before the event, which then
dramatically affects an already worried NRC. Such behavior implies that if
plant performance where already shaky, then a major incident could trigger
drastic reforms in the regulatory process, a highly plausible scenario. (Here
operates the principle that if already concerned, an event triggers significantly
more worries than if unconcerned, when the same event triggers few
worries.)
Figure 4.20 below shows that a troubled industry, as indicated by a high rate of
LERs, also heightens public concern. More events spark interest group
actions and media attention, providing the information which alters public
opinion.
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Figure 4.20: Public Concern
LERs [5, 10,20]
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Figure 4.21: Public Concern
Industry Public Relations [1, 2, 4]
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Industry Public Relations represents the industry's efforts to persuade public
opinion in support of nuclear power. Impacts on regulation or government
concern are indirect byproducts of less public concern and fewer public
actions. However, Figures 4.20 and 4.21 indicate that halving or doubling of
public relations efforts have negligible impact upon public concern.
4.3.3 Internal Variables
Where as the exogenous section reviewed model sensitivity to inputs from
beyond the social system boundaries, this section looks at sensitivity to
variations in internal parameters. Each sector within the model contains
several parameters which quantify the rates and calculations that define
material and information flows. Although all such parameters will not be
presented here, those which significantly affect the system shall be -- along
with a sample of others to enhance understanding of the model's operation.
Variables are presented by sector; only within the public sector will all
variable parameters be reviewed.
4.3.3.1 Public Sector
The four constants contained within the public sector guide public converting
and public donating: the development of concern and its influence. Because
the public sector is the foundation for social pressure, the model tends to be
very sensitive to changes in this sector's parameters.
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Figure 4.22: Public Concern
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Figure 4.23:
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The public constant specifies the degree of influence which incoming
information has upon the general public. It is the basis of public opinion, and
as Figures 4.22 and 4.23 show, the model is quite sensitive to public constant
variations. Since public opinion supports social pressure, large changes in
public concern are reflected in regulatory output.
4.3.3.1.2 Public Memory
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Figure 4.24: Public Concern
Public Memory [6, 12, 24]
Because public memory specifies the rate at which individuals forget the
information which cause them to become concerned, it is significant in
controlling the level of public concern, as here shown. A short memory leads
to lower concern levels because converted people readily forget and convert
back to the unconcerned, vice versa with lengthy memories. In essence,
public memory weights the original conversion process because length of
memory affects the rate of conversion necessary to maintain a given level of
concern.
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Figure 4.25: IG Resources
Ave Pub Donation [.5, 1, & 2]
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Figure 4.26: Public Concern
Ave Pub Donation [.5, 1, & 2]
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Figure 4.27: NRC Regulation
Ave Pub Donation [.5, 1, & 2]
The average public donation affects the system primarily through the level of
interest group resources, but in so doing, it also alters public concern since
interest group activities directly influence public opinion. The positive
feedback within this loop greatly enhances the impact of changes in public
donations to interest groups, accentuating the impact on the NRC whether
donations are increased or decreased.
4.3.3.1.4 Public Donating Fraction
No graphs are provided here since changes in the public donating fraction
mimic changes in the average public donation.
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Figure 4.28: IG Completed Actions
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Figure 4.29: NRC Regulation
Base Time [3, 6, & 12]
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Sensitivity runs indicate that changing governmental actions requires a
significant boost in interest group completed actions. In the above graph Base
Time ranges from 3 to 6 to 12 months producing a range of completed actions
but little change in regulation.
4.3.3.3 Congressional Sector
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Figure 4.30: Concerned LMKR
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Figure 4.31: Concerned LMKR
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Figure 4.32: Concerned LMKR
C_Memory [6, 12, & 24]
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Like the public sector, variables here guide Congressional converting and
influence. The C Constant which specifies media, industry, and interest
group influence, the SC Constant which specifies NRC influence, and C
Memory which specifies the average span of lawmaker interest all guide
converting, with the C and SC constants holding principle control. However,
even with relatively large swings in Concerned Lawmakers, only a limited
impact carries through to changes in governmental regulation (Figures 4.33
and 4.34 below). If this seems in error, note that the time of peak concern is
generally of insufficient duration to develop and pass new legislation which
might significantly alter regulatory practices. Personal pressure, not
legislation, is in action here.
The Active Frequency and Active Fraction, although not shown here, do
contribute significantly to Congressional influence upon the NRC. A
doubling of either term would double influence. Since concerned lawmakers
already (normal setup) peaks at over fifty percent, for converting to wield a
similar impact on NRC actions the average duration of concern must
increase: i.e. pressures which cause concern must last.
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Figure 4.33: NRC Regulation
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Figure 4.34: NRC Regulation
C_Memory [6, 12, & 24]
4.3.3.4 NRC Sector
Upon the NRC, constant parameters specify how factors affect concern and
the speed of work. Time constants which define the rate of inquiry, reporting,
and regulation must vary significantly more than here to drastically alter the
quantity of actions performed (not shown). However, the NRC Constant,
which specifies the influence of external factors, and NRC Action Influence
Time, which specifies the influence of NRC actions, both wield substantial
influence upon NRC concern and significantly impact regulatory actions.
Regulatory actions are impacted more by the action influence time because
NRC actions are the primary path for lowering concern -- the more time
between action and dissipation of concern, the more time for concerns to
initiate even more actions. A negative feedback loop exist between concern
and action, the strength of which is defined by NRC Action Influence Time.
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Chapter 5
5.0 Policy Implications
Policies are the laws, regulations, rules, and common practices with which
government, industry, and individuals structure their actions. Each day,
organizations and individuals function by making choices: what to produce,
how much to produce, how to communicate, what to communicate, when to
operate, how to distribute resources, how to govern, etc. Generally, such
choices are not random, but follow some structure. This may be formalized
in terms of government laws and company rules or informal in terms of
societal customs, individual habits, and corporate routines. System dynamics
provides a tool for studying how these decision structures and rules affect
social dynamics. Within the nuclear industry, such knowledge might foster
the development of policies which lessen the antagonism between the public
and industry while maintaining safety and generating electricity at
competitive cost. Looking at industry policy is one purpose the Social
Pressure, Safety Regulation Model. This chapter discusses some of the policy
implications within the SPSRM.
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5.1 Utility
In choosing to build and operate a nuclear power plant, electric utilities create
an increased risk to public health and safety. Although good engineering and
construction practices combined with diligent operation minimizes the
potential for harm, many within the public fear nuclear power and feel that it
is an unnecessary risk. In response, both to technical risk and public concerns,
the federal government regulates the construction and operation of civilian
nuclear facilities. Yet even with government oversight, public opposition to
nuclear power remains and has had significant impact upon the industry.
Recognizing not only public influence but also public concern and fear, how
should the nuclear utility manage social responsibilities and interactions?
Within the SPSRM, the social system begins with the general public and ends
with government regulation. Information about nuclear power from the
utility and other sources motivates the concerned public to initiate actions
which lead to regulatory changes. These changes directly affect the nuclear
utility. However, this is a partial view; not only does the public respond to
the nuclear industry but the industry responds to the public -- changing utility
actions to address social concerns. These changes beget new social concerns
beginning the cycle of action, reaction anew. However, the SPSRM does not
encompass the utility's decision structure. That must be addressed by future
studies. Here, utility's actions are exogenous, and reactions to the social
system are neglected. This limits the usefulness of the model, but
nevertheless, the SPSRM indicates how and where the utility might
influence system behavior.
Utility efforts to influence public behavior and actions fall into two categories:
active efforts to affect opinions and passive information provided to the
public about utility performance. By virtue of being a nuclear plant operator,
nuclear utilities believe nuclear power a credible option for generating
electricity. They actively seek public, Congressional, and NRC acceptance of
the viability of nuclear power and of their competence in operating a plant.
These efforts occur through direct contact with each model sector and indirect
interaction through the reporting activities of the media. Additionally,
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information about plant performance disseminates through the media,
interest groups, and the utility, influencing public and government opinion.
These opinions ultimately affect utility actions. Although the utility often
acts in response to external influences, utilities control their own actions:
how to direct public relations activities, how to structure interactions with the
NRC, and how to operate the nuclear plant. Consequently, these are the
points where the utility could manipulate its own structure and policies to
ultimately affect the social system.
5.1.1 Public Trust
The operation of a nuclear plant does not occurs in a vacuum, but rather in a
populated society. It is a hazardous activity, but one which is currently
accepted by the majority of society. However, in allowing a utility to build
and operate a nuclear power plant, society has certain expectations of the
utility. The public expects that the utility will build and operate the plant
safety (display a high degree of technical competence); that the utility will be
truthful in communicating any hazards that the plant imposes; and that the
utility will place the public's welfare above its own financial gain.(Barber
1983) In an open, democratic society, there must be a degree of trust for
society to allow a utility, or anyone else, to build and operate a nuclear power
plant. However, trust, or a degree of distrust, is also why society demands
regulation of such hazardous activities and why many within society actively
seek to halt or alter nuclear operations.
Is distrust within society justifiable? Utilities may feel slighted or wronged by
public opposition, but a realistic assessment of history and human behavior
might indicate that questioning the motivations and technical competence of
those who place one at risk is generally prudent behavior. If this is accepted,
policies targeted at lessening social friction would focus on building and
maintaining public trust. This seems most likely to follow from consistent
examples of competence and frankness. If the industry claims immunity
from mishaps and then they occur, trust will be difficult to recapture.
Openness about risk, mishaps, and solutions can demonstrate a utility's
understanding of public risk and their acceptance of responsibility to assure
safety. Public trust should never be a given. Utility actions will probably
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always be questioned, and maintaining public trust will probably require
continuos reassurance.
Public trust within the SPSRM is not dissaggregated as such but is represented
in the public constant term which correlates utility public relations to public
conversion. A skeptical public distrusts the utility and places more weight on
intervener and media activities. If the utility could build and maintain trust,
then with time public opposition might dissipate.
5.1.2 Group Interventions
Because groups typically exert more political clout than the individual citizen,
people with common concerns routinely band together to further their
common cause. Many such groups, both pre-existing and newly formed,
express interest about the nuclear power industry. Most of these groups
oppose nuclear power in general or have unique concerns over a particular
plant.
The SPSRM utilizes interest groups as the only means for the public to act on
social concerns. It also provides limited means for utilities to interact with or
respond to interest groups. Utilities affect interest group activities only
through performance. In a sense, interest groups rally around nuclear events
because such incidents visibly demonstrate their concerns. Reducing or
eliminating events is the only means within the SPSRM for utilities to
directly deal with interest groups. An alternative path for influencing
intervener groups exists through the public, since the public directly supports
interest group formation and activities. As discussed in the previous section,
to influence the public, utilities must gain public trust. If the public believes
that the utility is both committed to public safety and competent to operate a
nuclear plant, then they might express fewer concerns. Here again, public
trust provides the foundation for social harmony with the utility. The public
must believe that safe nuclear power is feasible, that the utility is competent
to operate a safe plant, and that the utility will do so. It takes continuous and
consistent exhibition of competence and openness to gain such trust.
Maintenance of this trust may be the most effective means to counter interest
group activities.
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5.1.3 Regulation and Oversight
How the utility responds to regulations is not covered by the SPSRM. Still,
the interactions between the NRC and utility affect the cost of operation and,
if not the actual safety, certainly the perceived safety of the nuclear plant.
Consequently, strategies for dealing with regulation and regulators are
paramount in nuclear operations.
Actual regulation of a nuclear plant occurs in a variety of fashions. Federal
Codes specify required actions by both the NRC and the utility; technical
specifications approved by the NRC bind the plant to certain operating
conditions; the NRC creates new operating requirements through Notices,
Bulletins, Generic Letters, etc.; and NRC inspectors may require changes if
practices, procedures, or other items are identified as insufficient during
inspections. Requests or requirements from the NRC may be specific or
general: identifying a required action or requesting a utility plan to address
concerns. Either way, the utility is responsible for all NRC concerns. Of all
forms of regulation, NRC inspections are the most open-ended. During
inspections, NRC inspectors may inquire about almost any aspect of the plant.
Although the NRC acts to assure safety, many utilities complain that
responding to regulatory inquiries and actions can drain significant resources
and have questionable impacts on plant safety. Answering questions and
inquiries before, during, and after inspections takes time and pulls engineers
and staff away from other projects. Developing, negotiating, and
implementing responses to bulletins, generic letters, and other issues also
requires significant efforts in time and resources. If the utility questions the
relevancy of NRC stipulated improvements in safety or operations, what
resources should a utility apply toward satisfying the NRC? How will utility
actions affect NRC relationships, and how will this affect future regulatory
actions? How will utility actions toward the NRC affect relations with the
public and interest groups? Will such actions affect safety, performance, or
cost?
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Utility response to the NRC is a significant policy choice which affects social
behavior. Coefficients within the SPSRM such as the Public Constant,
Congressional Constant, and NRC Constant depend upon relationships and
interactions. These are the variables incorporate trust and acceptance of
various actors and actions. Better relations with the NRC might move these
variables in the utility's favor. However, because the utility's response to
these interactions is not within the scope of this thesis, the above questions
will remain open until further research can be performed.
5.1.4 Media
Information shapes public opinion, which guides social action.
Consequently, how the media represents the nuclear industry is of great
importance to utilities. Unfortunately for the utility, what makes news tends
to be the unusual event or accident, not the well functioning plant. Even so,
how the utility relates to the media and how media perceives the utility will
affect the manner in which stories are presented.
With the media, as with other groups the utility interacts with, trust plays an
important role. Reporters often distrust the words of utility representatives,
believing the utility's story is generally biased. Consequently, when reporting
the news, more weight may be given to other sources, leaving the utility
perspective out. The utility may never eliminate a bias in presenting plant
information, but it might improve it's credibility. Relationships with the
press hinge on plant performance and how the utility presents performance.
If the plant's performance is poor, the press will question the utility's
competence in running the plant, even if the utility is honest with operating
information. The utility must operate the plant safety and then be candid
about operating information, both positive and negative. The press may not
expect a perfect plant, but the press, like the public, expects problems to be
dealt with effectively. Being open about operating concerns in addition to
actions which address them might build stronger relationships with the
media. Such relationships are necessary if the utility expects favorable
representation within the public media.
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5.1.5 Utility Policy Review
The primary purpose of creating the SPSRM is to study how the social system
reacts to the operating nuclear plant. Yet, this reaction also affects the future
plant operations. Consequently, how the utility interacts with the social
system becomes quite significant for nuclear operations.
No matter how safe a nuclear plant is, it still presents some risk to public
health and safety. It is this risk, and the distrust that the utility can or will
adequately address this risk, that feeds social concern with the nuclear
industry. Consequently, if a utility undertakes the construction and operation
of a nuclear plant and expects the public to support this endeavor, it must
demonstrate not only to the NRC but to the public that it can safely operate
such a facility. This requires policies which continuously and consistently
demonstrate the general safety and feasibility of nuclear power, the utility's
competence to operate a plant, and the utility's placement of public safety
over private gain. Public support will follow only when the public trust that
the utility can and will operate a nuclear plant safely.
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Chapter 6
6.0 Summary and Conclusions
In the early years of the commercial nuclear industry, when swords were
being transformed into plowshares, nuclear power promised to one day
dominate electricity generation. Perhaps it will, but that time has yet to come
to pass. Even though nuclear reactors produce steam for generating
approximately twenty percent of the United States' electricity needs, the
industry appears to have stagnated. Financial and social constraints have
brought the nuclear crusade to a stand-still. During the early years, the 1950s
and 1960s, commercial nuclear power appeared to have significant public
support. The Federal Government encouraged commercialization of nuclear
technologies and financed research and development efforts. However, by
the 1970s, public opposition to nuclear power was a significant force, and
following the Three Mile Island Incident, social constraints from public and
government intervention drastically altered the development and operation
of the nuclear industry.
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The concerns that have driven public opposition to nuclear power find their
origins in both the technical realities of nuclear technologies and the
psychological and social uncertainties connected with nuclear energy, modern
warfare, and social power. Inherent to the utilization of fissionable materials
for generating electricity, providing medical care, or any other use, is the
presence of radioactive matter and the release of small quantities radiation.
Radiation presents a real threat in that significant doses can kill or harm
humans and other living organisms. In addition to the fear that radiation
will emanate from power plants, nuclear technology can elicit fears associated
with nuclear bombs, such as the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Although power plants cannot explode like a nuclear bomb, the psychological
association and imagery persist. The security and secrecy that have
traditionally followed nuclear technology seem to only enhance such fears. A
consequence of these public concerns is a citizenry that distrust most anything
associated with nuclear technology, giving the commercial nuclear industry a
poor imagine and ultimately leading to significant social constraints.
The question this thesis has raised is whether the interactions between the
public and the nuclear industry result in a net positive benefit. Public
concerns drive public actions directed toward altering nuclear plant
construction or operation. Responses to this public action from the nuclear
utility may appease the public's concern or create more concern leading to
additional public action requiring additional utility response and so on and so
on, creating a loop of action and reaction with uncertain consequences.
Making the consequences even more uncertain is the fact that the constraints
created by the public and the responses developed by the nuclear utility may
take years to display a benefit, or lack thereof. Consequently, the complexity
and delays of the connections and feedbacks between the public domain and
the nuclear utility make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the
unaided mind to assess, let alone predict, the impacts of social interactions
upon the nuclear industry.
The Social Pressure Safety Regulation Model recognizes the complexity of the
public's interactions with the nuclear industry. It is this complexity that the
SPSR model seeks to emulate. The structures and policies actually
incorporated in the SPSRM represent the perspectives and mental
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representations of individuals from both the nuclear industry and from
several social organizations that interact with the nuclear utility.
Simulations of the SPSRM demonstrate the non-intuitive behavior of
dynamic systems. The social pressure safety regulation system was simulated
with a nuclear plant event, on the order of a Three Mile Island Incident,
exogenously inputted to the model. Public concern immediately rose as
might be expected, but died out relatively quickly. Interest group activities
spiked following the event, again dying out relatively quickly (a few months).
With public pressure being so short lived, one might expect a relatively
minor reaction from Federal Regulatory Agencies, the NRC. However, what
the event and public pressure did was to initiate a series of actions which then
took years for maturation. NRC concern rises immediately causing the
agency to initiate numerous projects. Legal requirements begin to change
approximately a year following the event and continue for four or five more
years. Consequently, the bulk of regulatory changes occur almost four years
after the incident, long after the public has forgotten their concerns over the
event. The SPSRM demonstrates that cause and effect may not be
immediately apparent. After a year, a concerned public may have concluded
that the NRC did little in response to the event, eroding their confidence in
the government's actions. However, the utility seeing the influx of
regulatory changes three or four years later may conclude the NRC excessive
in their regulatory responsibilities.
The model presented within this thesis concentrates on the public's ability to
influence the development of governmental regulation and assumes that is
the only social driver influencing the nuclear utility. However, it is
recognized that other pathways for influence exist. For example, questions
such as how the public may influence the financial resources available to the
nuclear utility or how the public may directly affect the perspectives and
attitudes of individuals working in the nuclear industry are potentially
relevant but have been left for future research efforts. Despite the limited
scope, the SPSRM does indicate that a more enhanced model could provide
greater insight into the mechanisms through which the public alters nuclear
plant performance.
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Given the uncertainty of future energy supplies and the potential role of
nuclear power in supplying these needs, it would benefit society to have a
better understanding of the impact of the public's involvement with the
nuclear utility and the appropriateness of the nuclear utility's response to that
involvement. Nuclear fission represents one alternative for meeting
society's energy demands. Although it is an alternative which has inherent
hazards and risk, environmental or resource concerns may make nuclear
fission one of a few viable options for generating electricity at a reasonable
cost in significant scale. If nuclear power is to remain a presence in the world,
it would be in society's interest to maintain the safest industry possible.
Understanding how public concerns influence the industry is paramount in
this effort.
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